TRINiff COILEG
llB~AR_Y

M.OOR.E
COLLECTION
RELATING
TO THE

FA~

EAST

CLASS NO. _ _

BOOK NO. _ _
VOLUME----==--

ACCESSION NO.

=--~IL.!T"

China, America and International
Financial Readjustment
In respect of measures calculated to ameliorate the

present situation of China by action of the Conference on
the Limitation of Armaments and Pacific Ocean and Far
Eastern Questions, two points have been suggested:
(a) An undertaking by the Powers to proceed without
delay to readjust all foreign "concessions" in China
in accordance with the Principles already agreed
to by the Conference, viz: the Ten Proposals of
China, and the Four Proposals of the American
Government.
(b) China's foreign financial obligations to be placed in
the same category as other international endebtedness in case there hereafter is a readjustment of
same, or an international moratorium.
The meaning of these suggestions perhaps requires some
elucidation. The essence of them is that in case there is an
international conference, or commission, convened to examine, ascertain the equities of, and to readjust international credits and obligations with a view of restoring and
stabilizing industry and commerce, that China's foreign obligations and commitments of an economic character will be
included within the purview of such a Conference and of its
acts.
It is likely that such a Conference will be called soon;
probably within a short time after the Armaments and
Far East Conference has adjourned. The American Government so far has declined suggestions that the Armaments and Far East Conference would discuss international finances; it has refused to commit itself regarding
the debts due to the United States by other Powers until the
positions of those Powers visavis armaments and Pacific
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Ocean and Far Eastern questions are disclosed. But the
question of a readjustment or liquidation of international
financial obligations remains suspended among the greater
issues that demand prompt action.
In respect of this question of international financial
liquidation the United States holds the key. There can be
no readjustment except with the consent of the American
Government, because the American Government is almost
the only creditor nation among the Powers. All of the
Powers except Japan owe vast amounts to the United States
which they cannot pay now, and which it may be that they
never will be able to satisfy in terms of finance. But the
same general Rule applies to international debts which
applies to corporation and private debts. If a debtor cannot pay in money, whatever it has in the way of property
is liable to seizure in liquidation. If nations cannot pay
their debts by financial process, whatever other assets they
possess thereupon become liable to seizure in liquidation.
The assets of a nation roughly may be classed as revenues,
resources and territory.
The practical application of this Rule to the case of
China is pertinent. In security for foreign debts China
has been required to give liens on and supervision of her
means of revenue, concessions involving her natural resources and communications, and leases of her territory.
The Rule has been applied to China without abatement in
principle, although sometimes relaxed in practice. The
Rule as applied to China is that she must fulfill her foreign
obligations or surrender some of her assets to foreign ad·
ministration or control.
The Rule and Other Nations
Turn to other nations. If the Rule as applied to China

be applied to other nations, then in case Great Britain
and France and Italy (to limit the illustration) do not or
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cannot pay their debts to the United States, then the American Government legally and morally is justified in demanding other forms of compensation, such as concessions, or
territory.
If a private person CANNOT pay his debts it is termed
baukruptcy: if he WILL NOT pay his debts it is regarded
as dishonest.
If a State cannot pay its debts it is insolvent: if a State
will not pay its debts it is termed repudiation.
A person who because of misfortune or incompetence or
oppression cannot pay his debts is entitled to and usually
obtains sympathy and pity. A person who can but will not
pay his debts is not entitled to sympathy, and rigorous
methods to colle~t such debts are considered to be justified.
There may be sympathy for a weak nation which cannot
pay its debts, but is willing to pay them. But a ·Power
which cannot pay its debts thereby raises presumptions
against its pretentions of being a Power. A Power which
will not pay its debts should be made to pay them or lose
its rating as a Power, and if it has any assets they should
be taken in liquidation of the debts.
Many nations are in debt to the United States now; but
for purpose of illustration I will confine comparisons to the
principal debtor Powers and to those nations which have
"interests" or possessions in the Far East and China. This
is not intended as a mathematical demonstration; therefore
the figures used are not presented as accurate, although
they approximate the real figures.
Roughly, nations which are participating in the
Armaments and Far East Conference owe the United
States Government $12,000,000,000 principal and interest.
A recent published statement showed that over $1,000,000,000 arrears of interest is due, and the debtor nations
are falling in arrears of interests at the rate of about
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$1,700,000 a day. What this means to the United States
may be comprehended by saying that if these debts were
paid now the American people need pay no national taxes
for four or five years; or the United States could build a
navy equal to the combined navies of Great Britain and
Japan and still have to collect no taxes for three years.
Recently the Chinese Central Government was unable
to meet on its maturity a small debt to an American Bank;
whereupon there was much criticism concerning China'.s
insolvency, and it even was mooted that China's position in
the Washington Conference would be impaired by the circumstance. Yet Powers sitting in the same Conference
owe billions to America on which they are not even paying
interest, and no suggestion was made that this fact sh9uld
impair their positions in the Conference. China is restricted
and cramped in her fiscal administration by conditions imposed by those same Powers so that she cannot make her
revenues meet her costs of administration, and also pay
heavy indemnity exactions to those same Powers. China
is hindered by the existence of foreign "concessions" and
the limitations imposed on her by the "sphere of influence"
Powers from freely developing her own natural resources
and building up a modern material prosperity which soon
would relieve her financial stringency.
Several suggestions have been advanced regarding the
liquidation of the debts of the Powers to America. One
suggestion has the merit of extreme simplicity; it is for the
American Government to cancel the debts-to make the
other Powers a present of what they owe us, unconditionally.
Another suggestion is termed "readjustment." This
plan is to have all the so-called "Allies" nations mutually
wipe off their debts to each other.
Let us examine this readjustment plan. Great Britain
owes to the United States about $7,000,000,000 and other
[ 4]
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nations owe Great Britain a little less than that amount.
Therefore this mutual forgiving of debts would leave Great
Britain about even on the transaction, and would clear up
her books; British finance and trade would revive rapidly.
The readjustment plan has a further advantage for Great
Britain; she cannot well afford either to become insolvent
by failing to pay, or to repudiate by refusing to pay her
debts to America. Great Britain has assets which under
those circumstances the United States might demand in
liquidation-Canada for instance. On the other hand, a
good part of what is due to Great Britain from the other
"ally" nations may be classed as dubious and perhaps uncollectable and unrealizable. So by cancelling dubious
debts Great Britain would relieve herself of a debt to America which is collectable from her in one form or another.
France, Italy and Belgium each owe more than they
have debts due them as offsets. Those nations would gain
hugely by the "wipe off" plan.
Finance--Political and Economic

America does not owe anything to other nations. By
the "wipe off" plan America is the only creditor-she pays
the whole bill.
It is argued that it is good "business" for America to
wipe off these debts, for that will revive foreign trade. If
we let the other nations off from paying us that money,
they will be able to buy from America great quantities of
goods, and industry and commerce will revive quickly.
There is something in that argument: but to the writer it
is not altogether clear that America surely will profit by
the deal. In ordinary trading, if one has goods to sell and
gives a prospective customer the money with which to buy
one's goods, it amounts to the same thing as giving him the
goods; and if after one has given away the money, the cus[ 5]

CHINA,AMERICA and INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL READJUSTMENT

tomer goes across the street and buys in another store, that,
as Abe Potash would say, "is something else again." It
might be that a part of or all of the capital thus restored to
other nations would be used to build up and extend their
economic communications with other countries in competition with American trade. It even might be used to develop the "interests" of those nations in China under their
"sphere of influence" system, to the relegation of the OpenDoor and the handicapping of American opportunity in
China.
There is something to be said for the policy of "wipe
off" in business; of liquidation, of cleaning things up and
taking a fresh start. It may be a good thing all around to
accept a man's plea in bankruptcy and allow him to begin
again with a clean slate. But if the creditors learned that
the bankrupt was buying expensive motor cars, and keeping a mistress and a yacht, they probably would feel differently toward him. How a bankrupt spends his time and
his money have a bearing on his claim for leniency and on
his chances to "make good" afterward.
There, however, is a fallacy in discussing this question
of international financial readjustment in economic terms
exclusively. These debts of the Powers to America were
not incurred as economic transactions. The debts were
incurred by the Powers, the loans were made by the United
States, for political reasons solely. Since political consid-

erations provided the reason for creating the debts, it seems
to follow logically that political considerations inevitably
are involved in their liquidation.
The policy of the American Government and the ideals
of the American people are opposed to war and to excessive armaments. It properly is argued that the American
people should not consent to be taxed to maintain excessive
armaments. Yet it is proposed to present certain Powers
with a vast amount of money that is due to America when
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it is known that a great part of it, or its equivalent, will be
spent on armaments. In order to give this immense amount
to those nations the American people will have to tax themselves that much more. Is there any difference in morals
between Americans taxing themselves for their own armaments and taxing themselves to pay for the armaments of
foreign nations?
Furthermore, by the process of taxing Americans to
support FOREIGN armaments, it is possible that they may
be taxing themselves to support armaments which may be
used to contradict and defeat the liberal policies of the
American Nation, and to strengthen alliances which undermine the security of America. The Anglo-Japanese .Alliance is a case in point. A few days ago Lord N orthcliffe
telegraphed from China to an American newspaper as follows:
"The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the sharpest
sword in the hands of the war party of Japan. Under
the cover of this alliance the war party of Japan spends
more than half of the people's income on the Navy,
Army and fortifications. Japan's past arrogant attitude toward the United States w:ould not have been
possible without this alliance. The Chinese, who detest this alliance as much as Americans and the British
in the Orient do, blame Great Britain for their sufferings at the hands of Japan. One bad result of the
alliance is the attitude of the war party toward the
desire of Japanese for real democratic government.
Owing to the strength of the war party, the right of the
people to hold public meetings and the freedom of the
press are at the mercy of police and censors controlled
by the military party. . . . Kill the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance and you will rob the military party of half
its power, though they will want watching this year,
next year, and many years to come."
[ 7]
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It is announced that the British Government intends to
spend a large amount on a naval base at Singapore. In
conjunction with the Japanese naval bases in the Far East,
American naval operations in those oceans thereby will be
circumscribed. It is not pretended that Americans have a
right to dictate to the British Government how it will spend
its revenues; but Americans have something to say about
how American revenues will be spent by the British Government in naval combinations which directly affect the
most important foreign policy of the American Government.
What is called the Hay Doctrine today is the most important foreign policy of the United States. It has superceded the Monroe Doctrine in importance by reason of world
developments and tendencies which have diminished the
dangers apprehended by Monroe and have given growth to
new and more imminent dangers in the Pacific. The linking of Pacific Ocean and Far East questions with the question of limitation of armaments by the American Government is a concrete recognition of these changes.
The fiction that, now that the war _is over, the huge
"Allies" debts to America should be treated on a purely
economic basis and readjusted on that basis should be given
no credence. Those debts usually are termed "inter-Allies"
obligations, probably in order to cover them with a veil of
thoughtless sentiment. Yet there is something in the term
"inter-Allies obligations" that really is pertinent now. The
money was loaned to help nations allied with us, or rather
associated with us in war. All the more reason why theoretically it might remain on that basis in any readjustment,
and not be used to strengthen combinations or to promote
policies inimical to American security, interests and ideals.
There is a difference between loans to "Allies," and giving
[ 8]
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money to nations that are combined with other Powers
against America or to Powers which oppose the major
propositions of American foreign policy.
China and Readjustment

China's foreign debt roughly can be placed at $1,500,000,000. Of this about $350,000,000 is for indemnities;
mostly due .to the "boxer" disorders in China (1900), and
the indemnity exacted by Japan after the China-Japan war.
Incidentally, the United States long ago forgave China the
part of the "boxer" indemnity allotted to America that remained after legitimate American claims were paid. About
$250,000,000 is still due to the other ·P owers-Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Russia-of that
"boxer" indemnity. China already has paid more than fair
compensation (compared with the adjustment regarded as
equitable by America) for actual damages done to foreigners' life and property by the "boxer" rioters, and still owes
nearly as much as she did when the indemnities were first
assessed, because of accrued interest. If the other nations
would adopt now the policy which America has pursued it
would be a great relief to China and would help restore her
fiscal solvency and stability.
In any readjustment of "inter-Ally" indebtedness Japan
probably will not be included unless Russia and China are
brought into the settlement. In this connection it should
be remembered that China is an "Ally"; having, chiefly on
the urging of the United States, declared war on Germany
and Austria in 1917.
"What a magnificent gesture" remarked a French
statesman apropos the suggestion that America shall "wipe
off" what is due her from our former associates in war.
But the proposal as it is conceived in England and Europe,
so far as I have observed, is limited to Europe and England
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in application: it does not include members of the "Allies"
in Asia.
Why that limitation? The "wipe off" round robin does
not include China, it seems. Great Britain is to forgive
France and Italy and Belgium; France is to forgive Belgium and perhaps Italy (but not Germany); Italy is to forgive ( ?) ; and America is to forgive them all.
Except China ! Why except China?
It is as important to America to establish and maintain
tranquillity in the Far East and in the Pacific Ocean as it
is to accomplish those results in Europe. A process which
perhaps may stabilize one-half of the world while leaving
the other half unstabilized hardly can be regarded as complete. The American nation faces TWO continents across
two oceans; and at this moment it is from the Asian continent and across the Pacific Ocean that the more serious
portents of danger come. If the American people are to
forgive to England and Europe (which means tax themselves) the sum of twelve billions of dollars, why not make
the transaction cover our other national exposure by spreading it out a little?
Suppose the American Government should propose to
the Powers that they will submit all their monetary claims
against China and concessions in China from which the
Chinese want to be relieved and which are contradictory to
the Open-Door to the appraisal of an international commission of experts, and when the total amount thus is fixed, to
credit it against the debts of those nations to America. That
would reduce the debts of those nations to America, and
would make China owe it instead. Then if America should
want to readjust the "inter-Allies" obligations on a "wipe
off" or any other basis, the process would include China and
extend t1 e alleged beneficent influence of the action to the
Far East as well as to Europe.
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If such a proposal should be made by the American
Government I rather expect that some of the debtor Powers
would raise objections; that they will want to "beg off"
their debts to America, but will not want to be equally reasonable and generous with respect to China's obligations to
them. Yet it is clear that such a policy and action almost
immediately would relieve the existing fiscal embarrassment of China, tend to restore tranquility there by removing the principal causes of international friction in China,
give a tremendous stimulus to China's commerce and peaceful industrial development, and the trade of all foreign
nations with China.
And if the American Government should make such a
proposal to the Powers, and they should decline to assent
to it, what reasons would they give for so declining?
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